Does Mr. Piccone's Pennsylvania reciprocal suspension, based upon the USPTO action conducted in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 24's mandated discovery and due process protections, violate the principles of Selling v. Radford and Pa.R.D.E. 216(c)(1) — (c)(3)?

Question Presented The United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has enacted regulations, including 37 C.F.R. § 11.52, abolishing discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure guaranteed by 35 U.S.C. § 24, in contested disciplinary cases. The discovery rights of this statute have been held to insure “. . . that the fundamental elements of procedural and substantive due process will be . accorded to parties to [contested cases]”, Jn re Natta, 388 F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1968). After proceedings, conducted in flagrant violation of other federal law, in which Mr. Piccone was denied necessary documents and testimony from USPTO employees and former clients with which to defend against charges of misconduct, the USPTO suspended Mr. Piccone’s registration to practice for three (3) years. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then initiated reciprocal discipline and suspended Mr. Piccone’s state license based upon the flawed USPTO action. When underlying USPTO disciplinary proceedings are conducted according to regulations which abolish both 35 U.S.C. § 24’s mandated discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and, the statute’s attendant due process protections, does Mr. Piccone’s Pennsylvania reciprocal suspension, based upon the USPTO action, violate the principles of Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917), and, it’s Pennsylvania equivalent, Pa.R.D.E. 216(c)(1) — (c)(3)? 2