Does the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause require judges to follow a federal statute's legal definition even if the state law lacks such a definition?

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED 1. Does the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause (Article VI, §2) require the Judge(s) (both State & Federal) within STATE OF CALIFORNIA (as well as an other State) to follow an established "legal definition" (within a Federal Statute 'made in pursuance thereof') where NO such "legal definition" of said ‘term’ exists in the State's Law? ~ : 2. Does CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE (CPC) §667 .5(c) "legally ‘define''' the term, "Violent Felony?" or, Is CPC §667.5(c) a "legal definition" of the term, "Violent Felony" (since, by its own words, "For the purpose of this section" it only applies to one Penal Code sectiond?: 3. Are the State (and Federal) Judge(s)) within STATE OF CALIFORNIA required to utilize an established Federal "definition" (or its opposite) when a new ; State Constitutional provision using an “undefined term'' is created? 4. Do the Judge(s) (both State & Federal) within STATE OF CALIFORNIA violate Each's Oath of Office (& Canon #3), as well as Petitioner's Right to Due Process & Equal Protection of the Law, when Each FAILS:-& REFUSES to follow and abide by the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause and the established Federal definition of "Violent Felony" (18 USC §924(e)(2)(B)), and now, the definition of "Grime of Violence" (18 USC §16 See: Sessions v. Diyama, 2018 US LEXIS 2497), when they Fail & Refuse to acknowledge the, ipso facto, ; ' "Non-Violent" Statutory ‘elements' of Petitioner's offenses which is within the purview of the ‘newly created State Constitutional prowision (Article I, §32, CA Constitution, "non-violent" felony offenses)? "Expressio/Inclusio . unius est, exclusio alterius." = 'The of one, is the exclusion of the other.'! : ; : 5. Are the "Jurist(s)"' who decided U.S. v. Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1010-1011 : (9th Cir. Cal. 1988) and others who cited said case (ie: U.S. v. Parker, . Taylor _v. U.S., U.S. v. Chatman, Pazcoguin v. Radcliffe, Singh v. Ashcroft, ; U.S. v. Ladwig, U.S. v. Piccolo, U.S. v. Mi Kyung Byun, Delgado-Hernandez v. _.. Holder, Shepherd v. U. S., In re Christopher H., Hicks v. Feiock, & In re : .. Lance W., Supra.), "reasonable jurists who would find it debateable that the State Courts’ Judge's refusal to follow the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause,‘"'only a State Law Issue?" : ; 6. Does the inclusion of Statutory (Elements) "Non-Violent" offenses within an : alleged "List" of alleged "Violent" offenses, violate Petitioner's Federal Constitutional Right to Due Process and Equal Protection of the Law in the ' Light of the newly enacted State Constitutional provision? oo 7. Does the FAILURE & REFUSAL of the Judges in STATE OF CALIFORNIA (both State and Federal) to adjudicate the issue of "What is the ‘Primary Term' in the case of a "Non-Violent" Third-Striker's 25 to Life Sentence” (as the 25 to Life Sentence is an "Alternative Sentence" for purposes of Article LI, §32), . (Is it the maxiumum Term authorized/annexed to the underlying offense, or the 25 year 'minimum’ Term?), constitute ABDICATION OF JUDICTAL POWER as is ' outlined in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 US (6 Wheat) 264, 404 (1821) . 63a, & 9 . i