Whether the guilty plea entered was legal when the petitioner did not fully understand, know or intelligently accept the voluntary guilty plea agreement

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ‘ (1) WHETHER OR NOT THE GUILTY PLEA ENTERED WAS LEGAL WHENPETITIONER DID NOT FULLY UNDERSTAND, KNOW OR INTELLIGENTLY ACCEPT VOLUNTARY THE GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT AS PRESENTED BY THE UNITED STATES 2? SUGESTED ANSWER; NO ; In Strickland v. Washington, along with applicable case, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985), in Order for a guilty plea to be valid, it must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. See, Hill, 474 U.S. 52, 56. This Court established that a defendant enter a guilty plea upon Counsel’s advice, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether the advice was within the range of competence demand or of attorney in criminal cases, the twopart standard adopted in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, : 88 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). On Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985), the Supreme Court help that the Strickland test applies to advise given by Counsel in the context of guilty plea discussions. See id, at 58 (stating that “the Strickland v. ; : \ Washington test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel”. The Court determined that the prejudice prong in the context of the plea process “focuses on whether Counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process”. Id, at 58. : rt O Petitioner, Cirilo Flores, under the improper advice of Counsel entered a guilty plea, despite Petitioner repeated objections to doing so. Petitioner was sentenced to forty-six months imprisonment, twenty (20) years supervision release for the offense of possession of child pornography, for a crime Petitioner did not committed, but pled guilty under Counsel advise. On February 13, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2255, which the District Court denied on November 14, 2017, without an evidentiary hearing. Subsequently, Petitioner filed a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in which the Court affirmed the District . Court’s denial. (2) WHETHER OR NOT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT REPRESENTING PETITIONER’S BEST INTEREST IN WANTING TO GO TO TRIAL, INTER ALIA, AND NOT ENTER INTO A PLEA . AGREMMENT? SUGGESTED ANSWER; NO On May 9, 2012, at an interview with initial Counsel Jeremy H.G. ; Ibrahim, Esq., Petitioner advise him his goal to stand trial, and any plea agreement offer would be rejected. During Counsels representation, Counsel was trying to coerce Petitioner to enter into a guilty plea. Mr. Ibrahim presented multiples plea agreement offers, which were rejected every time. Petitioner addressed the issue to the District Court, and informed that Counsel TL was inducing Petitioner to enter a guilty plea despite Petitioner wishes to stand ; trial. Counsel was dismissed as Petitioner request. On April 3, 2013, Mia Roberts Perez, Esquire, was appointed as substituted Counsel. Counsel was advise to prepare for trial and not to engage into plea agreements with the District Attorney for any reason, that any plea agreement offer would be rejected as prior offers. Counsel responded that the judge informed her that this present case was for trial and not for a guilty plea offer. _ On June 21, 2013, Ms. Perez, filed two (2) motions on this case, in which confirmed that despite the allegations presented in this case, no evidence has been found on any electronic device belong to Petitioner. On July 11, 2013, Ms. Perez, presented Petitioner a forty-six (46) months plea agreement offer, which was rejected, and Petitioner advised | Counsel once again his wishes to stand trial. Surprisingly, Counsel a change of plea hearing without Petitioner consent, which was held on July 12, 2013. At the aforementioned “change of plea” hearing, Counsel advised Petitioner to waive his speedy trial right, and subsequently requested the Court for additional time to discuss a forty-six (46) months plea agreement offer that was p