Whether the 'crime of violence' definition in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW In Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), this Court held the “crime of violence” definition in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) void for vagueness for the same reasons it held 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) void for vagueness in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). This was a “straightforward application” of Johnson, the Court explained, since — just like the ACCA’s residual clause — § 16(b)’s residual clause required the court to identify a crime’s “ordinary case” in order to measure the crime’s risk under the categorical approach, and also employed an “‘illdefined risk threshold,” which together conspired to make § 16(b) unconstitutionally vague and void just like § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 138 S.Ct. 1215-16, 1223 (citing Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2557). In United States v. Davis, 138 S.Ct. 1979 (U.S. May 14, 2018) (No. 18-431), the Court will resolve whether the “crime of violence” definition 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), a provision worded identically to § 16(b), is unconstitutionally vague for the above reasons, or whether the Court can avoid declaring that provision unconstitutionally vague by reinterpreting § 924(c)(3)(B) to permit a “conduct-based” approach instead of the categorical approach. However, since Davis is a direct appeal case, it will not likely resolve the following questions which will be crucial for cases on collateral review: 1. If Davis holds § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague, is that ruling retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review? 2. If Davis reinterprets § 924(c)(3)(B) to require a “conduct-based” approach because the statute is unconstitutionally vague under the categorical approach, does a second or successive § 2255 petition challenging a conviction under the unconstitutional categorical approach “contain ... anew rule of constitutional law” as required by § 2255(h)(2)? i INTERESTED PARTIES There are no