Whether the denial of Section 3599 representation services under the wrong legal standard constitutes a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW In Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), this Court held that a motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) in a federal habeas corpus case does not violate the AEDPA rule against successive petitions if the 60(b) motion attacks a procedural ruling, or some other defect in the integrity of the habeas proceedings, and not the federal court’s previous resolution of a habeas claim on the merits. The Gonzalez Court reasoned that permitting 60(b) motions in federal habeas cases would not expose federal courts to frivolous litigation because a movant for relief under Rule 60(b) must establish extraordinary circumstances to reopen the judgment. This Supreme Court has never returned to clarify the requirements for Rule 60(b) in the AEDPA context. Since Gonzalez, circuits have split over how to differentiate true 60(b) motions from successive habeas petitions, including over whether the defect alleged in a 60(b) motion must have precluded the federal court from reaching the merits of the habeas claims, and whether the extraordinary circumstances alleged in the motion must be procedural in nature. The confusion following Gonzalez raises the following questions and requires guidance from this Court: 1. Does a district court’s denial of Section 3599 representation services under the wrong legal standard constitute a defect in the integrity of the proceedings under Rule 60(b), even though the district court previously ruled on the merits of the habeas claims? 2. Did the Fifth Circuit err by holding that a court cannot consider merits-based extraordinary circumstances under Rule 60(b)(6) because such arguments render a Rule 60(b) motion a successive habeas petition?