Whether the residual clause in Section 924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioners were convicted of conspiring to commit Hobbs Act robbery and conspiring to possess a firearm in furtherance of crimes of violence. The district court held that these offenses did not satisfy the definition of a crime of violence under the force clause in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), but that they did satisfy the definition in the residual clause in (c)(3)(B). The questions presented are thus: 1. Whether the residual clause in Section 924(c)(3)(B) is void for vagueness based on the holdings in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018); 2. and, if so, whether the unconstitutional vagueness of the residual clause in Section 924(c)(3)(B) can be cured by resort to a conduct-based approach instead of the categorical approach? i