No. 18-9267

John Loveman Reese v. Florida

Lower Court: Florida
Docketed: 2019-05-14
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
IFP
Tags: capital-sentencing cruel-and-unusual-punishment due-process eighth-amendment equal-protection jury-trial retroactivity
Key Terms:
AdministrativeLaw DueProcess Punishment
Latest Conference: 2019-10-01
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of Equal Protection and the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of capricious capital sentencing impose limits upon a state court's power to declare unconventional rules of retroactivity, and whether those limits were transgressed here

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Hurst v. Florida this Court struck down Florida’s longstanding capitalsentencing procedures because they authorized a judge, rather than a jury, to make factual findings that were the necessary precondition for a death sentence. On remand, the Florida Supreme Court held, as a state constitutional consequence, that a death verdict cannot be rendered without unanimous jury findings that at least one aggravating circumstance exists and that the sum of aggravation is sufficient to outweigh any mitigating circumstances and to warrant death. The Florida Supreme Court then held that it would apply both the federal and state jury-trial rights retroactively to inmates whose death sentences had not become final as of June 24, 2002 (the date of Ring v. Arizona, precursor of Hurst) but that it would deny relief to inmates whose death sentences were final on that date. Petitioner Reese is in the latter cohort. The questions he presents are whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of Equal Protection and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of capricious capital sentencing impose limits upon a state court’s power to declare unconventional rules of retroactivity, and whether those limits were transgressed here. 1 1 The Court denied certiorari on this precise issue in Hitchcock v. Florida, No. 17-6180; Kelley v. Florida, No. 17-1603; Fotopoulos v. Florida, No. 18-5060; Owen v. Florida, No. 18-6776; and Shere v. Florida, No. 18-7568, and it has denied certiorari in numerous other cases filed by death-row inmates affected by the Florida Supreme Court’s choice of June 24, 2002 as the cutoff date for retroactive relief under Hurst. See pages 12 13 infra. For the reasons stated at page 13 through page 20, paragraph 1 infra, counsel respectfully believes that the specific constitutional claims raised by the current Questions Presented nevertheless warrant fresh consideration. 1

Docket Entries

2019-10-07
Petition DENIED.
2019-06-27
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/1/2019.
2019-06-13
Reply of petitioner JOHN REESE filed.
2019-06-11
Brief of respondent STATE OF FLORIDA in opposition filed.
2019-05-10
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due June 13, 2019)
2019-03-27
Application (18A976) granted by Justice Thomas extending the time to file until June 3, 2019.
2019-03-22
Application (18A976) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from April 4, 2019 to June 3, 2019, submitted to Justice Thomas.

Attorneys

JOHN REESE
Christopher James AndersonLaw Office of Christopher James Anderson, Petitioner
Christopher James AndersonLaw Office of Christopher James Anderson, Petitioner
STATE OF FLORIDA
Carolyn M. SnurkowskiOffice of the Attorney General, Respondent
Carolyn M. SnurkowskiOffice of the Attorney General, Respondent