Davion L. Jefferson v. United States
DueProcess Privacy
Whether the district court violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment's Jury Trial Clause by directing a verdict on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)'s 'crime-of-violence' element
QUESTIONS PRESENTED A federal grand jury charged Davion Jefferson with violating the federal robbery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (five counts), and brandishing a firearm during three robberies, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). This latter provision applied only if Mr. Jefferson brandished the firearm during a “crime of violence,” which is defined in § 924(c)(3)(A) as a felony offense that, inter alia, “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Mr. Jefferson asked the district court to instruct the jury to find whether (or not) his offenses (the robberies) were committed with force. The district court not only refused to give this instruction, but instead directed a verdict on this element of the § 924(c) offense, instructing the jury that robbery qualifies as a crime of violence. The jury convicted Mr. Jefferson of two § 924(c) counts. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C), as interpreted in Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993), the district court was required to impose a 25-year consecutive term of imprisonment on the second count. The questions presented are: I. Did the district court violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s Jury Trial Clause when it directed a verdict on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s “crime-of-violence” element? II. In light of a recent Congressional clarification of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C), should this Court overrule Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993)? i