Whether a would-be appellant who missed Rule 4(a)(1)(A)'s deadline to appeal due to a lack of notice of the entry of judgment may seek relief under Rule 4(a)(5) within 30 days of the original deadline to appeal, without seeking relief under Rule 4(a)(6)

QUESTION PRESENTED As explained in her Rule 4(a)(5) motion to extend the time within which to notice an appeal, the thenpro se petitioner did not receive notice of the nominal judgment in her favor until 3 days after the deadline to appeal. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), (a)(5). Upon obtaining counsel and within 30 days of the original deadline to appeal. petitioner filed an unopposed motion to extend the time to appeal under Rule 4(a)(5). Acting swa sponte and without providing an opportunity to respond, the district judge found her motion untimely under Rule 4(a)(6), which provides a longer grace period in no-notice cases (180 days versus Rule 4(a)(5)’s 30 days), albeit with a quicker trigger to file (14 days from notice versus Rule 4(a)(5)’s 30 days from judgment). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that Rule 4(a)(6) displaces Rule 4(a)(5) in nonotice cases, splitting with the D.C., Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, which allow both rules to apply concurrently by their terms. Before adoption of the pertinent parts of 28 U.S.C. §2107(c) and Rule 4(a)(6) in 1991, Rule 4(a)(5)’s precursors applied to no-notice cases. The 1991 amendments that provide Rule 4(a)(6)’s 180-day grace period and 14-day trigger in no-notice cases expressly provided additional relief to Rule 4(a)(5)’s existing relief, with no express intent to sever no-notice cases from existing Rule 4(a)(5). The question presented is whether a would-be appellant who missed Rule 4(a)(1)(A)’s deadline to appeal due to a lack of notice of the entry of judgment may seek relief under Rule 4(a)(5) within 30 days of the original deadline to appeal, without seeking relief under Rule 4(a)(6). i