Should this Court clarify its decision in Twombly to settle § 1 'combination or conspiracy' pleading standards?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED e Since this Court decided Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), Circuits are split as to its interpretation and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissals of Sherman Act, § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1, claims have dramatically increased, thereby substantially chilling private antitrust enforcement. The “uniformity needed [in Twombly interpretation] for the rule of law and equal justice to prevail is lacking.” In re Travel Agents Commission Antitrust Litigation, 583 F.3d 896, 914 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting). Should this Court clarify its decision in Twombly to settle § 1 “combination or conspiracy” pleading standards? e Whether allegations that airline owners of ATPCO, a privately-held corporation which collects and distributes fare and fare-related data for the airline industry, together agreed to change an ATPCO rule governing airline fare structures, are sufficient to plead the element of “combination or conspiracy” that is illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1? e Are allegations that: (a) the airline owners of ATPCO met online at a particular time to discuss structural changes to airfare pricing; (b) that on the same date as the meeting, the airline owners, using similar language, announced that together they changed airfare pricing structures to, “prevent combining nonrefundable local fares to create a connecting itinerary;” and (c) that the airlines implemented the announced changes to fare structures, thereby drastically increasing multi-city fare pricing, sufficient to state a claim under § 1 of the Sherman Act?