Lakshmi Arunachalam v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, et al.
DueProcess Takings Securities Patent
Whether preclusive effect should not be given to agency/court determination where a financially conflicted agency/court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate
QUESTIONS PRESENTED PREAMBLE # I. Collateral Estoppel Effect Must Be Denied In Cases of Particularized Unfairness to the Precluded Party, Where the Overriding Concern of the System Should be that It Refuses to Sacrifice Fairness for Efficiency, To Avoid the Illogic and Unfairness of Wooden Application of the Doctrine. L Whether preclusive effect should not be given to agency/court determination where a financially conflicted agency/court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate. 2. Whether Collateral Estoppel must be denied where a litigant was disparately denied due process of a notice and hearing consistently by ali the courts. 3. Whether Collateral Estoppel must be denied when the lower courts failed to examine the record to determine what, exactly, was adjudicated in the earlier court or agency proceeding. 4, Whether a change in circumstances is unsuited for Collateral Estoppel effect. 5. Whether denial of Collateral Estoppel effect to the original determination is appropriate because of rapid accumulation of knowledge or the presentation of additional information, or if additional cogent and compelling information presented in subsequent action. 6. Whether Collateral Estoppel must be denied when a court ruling is not supported by detailed opinion containing "thorough findings of facts, conclusions of law, and a cogent legal analysis applying the relevant facts" entitled to preclusive effect. 7. Whether the lower court rulings must be reversed because the District Court erred in not considering Patent Prosecution History when claims are unambiguous in view of intrinsic evidence. 8. Whether the lower courts’ rulings are bills of attainder or ex post facto laws passed or laws impairing the obligation of contracts, violating the Contract Clause, Art. I, §10, clause 1 and Art. I, §§9 & 10, in dismissing the case for a false claim of Collateral Estoppel against the Government and private citizens after the Judge lost jurisdiction, prima facie evidence of which is the Judge himself admitted in writing he bought direct stock in a litigant. ii 9. Whether the District Court Orders are void as repugnant to the Constitution in denying access to the courts to a competent witness, to give testimony on claim construction and explain the invention and what was intended to be conveyed by the specification and Patent Prosecution History and covered by the claims. 10. Whether the lower courts denying Petitioner due process — a Hearing and a neutral Judge, voids their Orders. 11. Whether courts must deny Collateral Estoppel effect, absent certain essential procedures where a hearing must allow parties to present live witnesses and to cross-examine in a proceeding that turned on retaliatory motive, ; adjudication must meet the procedures required by the due process clause. 12. Whether Collateral Estoppel did not preclude inquiry into all issues, when the earlier court was concerned with one issue, and a subsequent civil action involved a different issue. 18. Whether Collateral Estoppel effect should be denied because the agency/court participated in prejudicial ex parte communications, and allowed one party to prepare findings of fact and rulings of law for the court in support of that party's own position without allowing the opposing party's participation. . 14. | Whether due process requires that a party have the opportunity to contest fully a particular resolution of an issue in the original proceeding if that resolution will bind the party in the future. 15. Whether the lower court proved itself to be a tribunal of competent jurisdiction to finally determine an issue essential to judgment in the case before it, so that that issue is conclusively determined for all future actions. 16. Whether the lower court Judge followed procedures that provide the litigant her "full and fair opportunity" to participate in the adjudicatory process. 17. Whether Petitioner was given a meaningful opportunity to participate in governmental action affecting indiv