Whether federal bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. §2113(a) is categorically a crime of violence

QUESTIONS PRESENTED (1) Is federal bank robbery as defined in 18 U.S.C. §2113(a) categorically a crime of violence, where the statute does not require an intentional use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent force? ‘ | (2) Whether (Mathis) establish a new rule and standard of review :to the elements of the offense rather than the (Fact) of prior conviction based upon the preponderance of evidence, effectively overruling . (Alamendez-Torres ) an (Apprendi) (Fact) of prior conviction stani.cudard of review based upon the preponderance of evidence standard? (3) Whether the categorical approach to the elements of an offense as _ set forth in Taylor v United States, Descamps, Doctorines, progeny apply in determining whether a defendant has previously been con. victed of a relevant predicate prior offense, for it to be available for enhancement. based on the elements rather than the (Fact) of prior conviction by the preponderance of evidence standard under : (Alamendez-Torres) and (Apprendi) for purposes of applying enhancements under provisions of the sentencing guidelines where the categorical approach governs prior convictions, the interpretive tool's of (Mathis) now governs the application of enhancements under the : sentencing guidelines, because (Mathis) standard of review cares nothing about the (Fact) of prior conviction based upon the preponderance of evidence standard, rather than the elements of the prior : offense. (Alamendez-Torres ) and (Apprendi) yields and gives way to the new standard of review established by (Mathis)? ; . -); (3) Where a statute of conviction does'nt have as an element the use, attempteduse or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, does the offense qualify as a crime of violence? (4)Where a statute requires the use attempted use or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, does'nt physical force absolutely have to be used to satisfy the statues requirement? (5)Whether Supreme Court recent decision in Nelson v Colorado 137 S.Ct. 1249 (2017) is far more reaching than just acquited conduct, can it not apply to underlying facts of prior convictions based on the prepondaerance of evidence standard, where (Alamendez-Torres ) (Apprendi) provides the government an avenue to circumvent the Constitution where a defendant ‘s prior conviction may no longer qualify based on Mathis Doctrine review to the elements rather than the facts underlying the prior conviction? (6) Whether (Alamendez-Torres ) (Apprendi) impact the district court's understanding of how a prior conviction is to be understood to apply ; , against a defendant in light of the interpretive tool's of (Mathis). Specifically, where a prior conviction is under an (Indivisible) statue, thatisn't susceptable to the categorical approach, and (Divisible) statutes that encompasses multiple degress of risk and classes of felonys? ve Under Nelson, a defendant maybe sentenced on facts arising — from conduct of the instant offense, but, ,may not be penalized for uncharged conduct that entails any fact that could constitute elements of a seperate offense other than the instant offense of conviction . 3. . viction. Seperate elements or facts may not be considered for purposes of sentencing, this is so as emphasized in Nelson, that a state may not engage in an end-run around the consitution by characterizing at sentencing uncharged facts that are actually elements of seperate offenses other than the instant offense as mere sentencing factors. To do so eviscerates Due Process and creates a circumvention of a defendant's Consittutional Right, Protections and Garuntee's. And this is why (Alamendez-Torres) (Apprendi) was decided wrong, because where a defendant's prior conviction is under a (Indivisible thats not aus. J or (Divisible) statutes encompasses lesser included offenses a Court commits reversable error that is not harmless error that is not harmless and miscalculates a defendant's base offense level