Whether the Federal Due Process Clause requires a state to apply a new interpretation of a state criminal statute retroactively to cases on collateral review

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Context In Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 57-58 (Fla. 2016), the Florida Supreme Court held: [A]1l the findings necessary for imposition of a death sentence are “elements” that must be found by a jury, and Florida law has long required that jury verdicts must be unanimous. Accordingly, we reiterate our holding that before the trial judge may consider imposing a sentence of death, the jury in a capital case must unanimously and expressly find all the aggravating factors that were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, unanimously find that the aggravating factors are sufficient to impose death, unanimously find that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances, and unanimously recommend a sentence of death. We equally emphasize that by so holding, we do not intend to diminish or impair the jury's right to recommend a sentence of life even if it finds aggravating factors were proven, were sufficient to impose death, and that they outweigh the mitigating circumstances. (emphasis added) .! Chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida, was enacted on March 13, 2017. It revised § 921.141, F.S. by 1 At the time of the decision in Hurst v. State, Article X, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provided: “Repeal of criminal statutes.-Repeal or amendment of a criminal statute shall not affect prosecution or punishment for any crime previously committed.” The Florida Supreme Court has explained that “the purpose of the ‘Savings Clause’ [wa]s to require the statute in effect at the time of the crime to govern the sentence an offender receives for the commission of that crime.” Horsley v. State, 160 So. 3d 393, 406 (Fla. 2015). The homicide at issue in Hurst v. State occurred on May 2, 1998. Thus, Florida’s substantive law as of May 2, 1998, governed as to the elements of the criminal offenses with which Hurst was charged. i confirming and incorporating Hurst v. State and its construction of the statute and the elements necessary for the range of punishment to include death. See Foster v. State, 258 So. 3d 1248, 1251 (Fla. 2018) (discussing “section 921.141, Florida Statutes, which was revised to incorporate the Hurst requirements; and chapter 2017-1, Laws of Florida, which amended section 921.141 to require that a jury's recommendation of death be unanimous”). After it issued Hurst v. State, the Florida Supreme Court treated its construction of the statute and the facts required to be established before a death sentence was permissible to be a procedural matter. Accordingly, it ruled that its statutory construction announced in Hurst v. State was applicable to death sentences that were not final before June 24, 2002. The date of the criminal act for which a death sentence was imposed was not relevant in determining if Hurst v. State had rendered the death sentence invalid because the State had not established the statutorily required facts to the satisfaction of a unanimous jury. The Unresolved Questions 1. Whether the Federal Due Process Clause requires a state to apply a new interpretation of a state criminal statute retroactively to cases on collateral review, and if . ii so, when?? 2. When a judicial decision provides a new interpretation of a controlling criminal statute to require additional facts or elements to be proven by the State beyond a reasonable doubt before a judge may consider imposing a death sentence, is it a ruling setting forth substantive law or one adopting a rule of procedure? 3. Whether Petitioner was denied his rights under the Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment when: (1) the Florida Supreme Court in his case refused to apply its recent construction of § 921.141, F.S., that before death was an available sentence, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, not just one aggravating circumstance, but also that the aggravating circumstances found were sufficient and that they outweighed the mitigating circumstances; and 2 This is the same question that this Court found worthy of c