No. 18-9380

Miguel Daniel Leal v. Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.

Lower Court: Ninth Circuit
Docketed: 2019-05-22
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Response WaivedIFP
Tags: circuit-court-deference constitutional-interpretation constitutional-law due-process federal-courts ineffective-assistance-of-counsel ineffective-counsel marital-communications-privilege marital-privilege ninth-circuit-review sixth-amendment speedy-trial speedy-trial-rights state-courts supervisory-power supreme-court-dicta
Key Terms:
DueProcess FifthAmendment HabeasCorpus CriminalProcedure Privacy JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2019-10-01
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Is SCOTUS dicta authoritative?

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED . 1. Is United States Supreme Court dicta which interprets the U:S. Constitution authoritative and controlling on Federal and State Courts, or may Federal Circuit Courts choose to adopt State Courts opinions and not follow this Court's opinions set forth in dicta? 2. If United States Supreme Court dicta is authoritative and controlling, did the 9» Circuit violate Article VI, Clause 2 (“the Supreme Law of the Land”) of the U.S. Constitution in failing to follow this Courts language in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171, 152 L. Ed. 2d 291 (2002)? . 3. Did the State of Arizona violate the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution when it removed “Retained Counsel of Choice” representing Mr. Leal in a criminal prosecution, due to a mere theoretical division of loyalties construed as an actual conflict? | 4. Did the Ninth Circuit err in the denial of Mr. Leal’s 28 USC 2254 petition claiming ; that the petition did not state a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, when the trial and appellate record is supported by United States Supreme Court dicta and facts? 5. Did the State of Arizona violate the “common law marital communications . privilege” recognized by the United States Supreme Court, when the trial court admitted and played in open court (as evidence) for the Trial Jury to hear Mr. Leal and his wife’s telephone communication? (United States Supreme Court dicta in: [Trammel v. United States, 4460 U.S. 51, 100 S. Ct. at 912; Blau v. United States, i-1 | ? 340 U.S. 332, 333, 71S. Ct. 301, 302, 95 L. Ed. 306 (1951) Wolfe v. United States, 291, U.S. 7, 18, 54 S.Ct. 279, 280, 78 L.Ed. 617 (1934); also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1976)] 6. Should this Court exercise its supervisory power to decide the conflicting decisions of the Ninth Circuit — U.S. District Court of Arizona: Miguel Daniel Leal v. Charles L. Ryan, Warden and Attorney General for the State of Arizona, and the Tenth Circuit — U. S. District Court of Colorado: United States v. Neal, 532 F. Supp. 942 (D.C. Colo. 1982); regarding the marital communications privilege and whether the husbands privilege to communicate in confidence with his wife entitles him to suppress his statements to her in the phone conversation? Apparently, this is a question of first impression in the Federal Courts. 7. Did the Ninth Circuit err in deferring to the State Court’s finding that Mr. Leal had objected at trial to the denial of his request to present one of his sisters as a rebuttal witness with respect to the State’s theory that flight demonstrated guilt, but the objection failed to state a constitutional ground, therefore, Mr. Leal’s claim that his constitutional rights (due process, compulsory process, and to present a defense per the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution) were waived? 8. Did the Ninth Circuit err in adopting the States summary background facts, (which omitted over two years of trial delays) without reviewing the entire timeline record; and accepting the District Courts justification of a speedy trial violation (which had already occurred). As follows: Mr. Leal’s “counsel objected to continuing the trial from January to March 2008, based on a violation of Leal’s speedy trial rights. The ‘1-2 > subsequent request to delay trial were based on Counsel’s schedule, -.” If the delays were not caused by the Defendant and he had previously invoked his Constitutional rights to a Speedy Trial, in writing and filed in court, were his constitutional rights violated? 9. Did the Ninth Circuit err in deferring to the State Court’s decisions denying ineffectiveness of trial and appellate counsel claims, stating the denials were not objectively unreasonable; when the Ninth Circuit’s decisions were based on flagrant misreading or not reading of the trial record? 10. Did the Ninth Circuit abuse its discretion by not considering other circuit courts authoritative decisions which addre

Docket Entries

2019-10-07
Petition DENIED.
2019-07-05
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 10/1/2019.
2019-05-20
Waiver of right of respondents Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al. to respond filed.
2019-05-14
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due June 21, 2019)

Attorneys

Charles L. Ryan, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.
Kathryn A. Damstra — Respondent
Kathryn A. Damstra — Respondent
Miguel Leal
Miguel Daniel Leal — Petitioner
Miguel Daniel Leal — Petitioner