Does the 'knowingly' provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) apply to both the possession and status elements of a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) crime?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1. Does the “knowingly” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) apply to both the possession and status elements of a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) crime? The Court will decide that issue in Rehaif v. United States, No. 17-9560. 2. Under the “realistic probability” standard of Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007), is it necessary to identify a reported case to establish that a state statute is overbroad vis-a-vis a federal definition if the plain language of the state statute so indicates? 3. Did the Eleventh Circuit err under Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-338 (2003) and Buck v. Davis, 137 S.Ct. 759, 773-774 (2017) in denying Petitioner a certificate of appealability based upon adverse circuit precedent, when the question of whether Florida felony battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.041(1) is an ACCA “violent felony” is debatable among reasonable jurists? i INTERESTED PARTIES There are no