Is Section 203's prohibition against threatening another with any offense a close fit to a legitimate penological interest?

QUESTION PRESENTED Mark Alan Lane is a federal inmate who has failed, repeatedly, to use methods of communication that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) finds acceptable to air his grievances with his incarceration. After mailing outgoing correspondence that the BOP deemed threatening, he was subjected to repeated sanctions under Disciplinary Code Section 203, which prohibits, inter alia, the mailing of “threats” to “another” of “any . . . offense.”1 Although such a sweeping prohibition is not possibly a close fit to any legitimate government interest, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Lane’s challenge to the regulation under Procunier v. Martinez.2 The panel’s reasoning is flawed, conflicts with this Court’s well-established precedent, and creates an impossible standard for inmates within this outlier Circuit. The Court should therefore grant certiorari to correct the Ninth Circuit’s misguided path, by answering the following question: Is Section 203’s prohibition against threatening another with any offense a close fit to a legitimate penological interest? 1 The full text of Section 203 prohibits “Threatening another with bodily harm or any other offense.” 28 CFR 541.3. 2 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). i