Are broad waivers of appellate rights lawful and, if so, what are the limits on their validity and enforcement?

QUESTION PRESENTED The right to appeal a criminal sentence is a statutory entitlement under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. But in many federal the Eastern District of Louisiana—local U.S. Attorney’s Offices have developed “standard” plea agreements requiring that all defendants wishing to plead guilty pursuant to a written agreement waive nearly all appellate and collateral relief rights. The Eastern District’s standard agreement includes the broadest and most restrictive appeal waiver available, mandating forfeiture of all appellate and collateral relief rights except attacks on sentences imposed in excess of the statutory maximum and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendants are required to enter into these agreements long before sentencing occurs, usually without any agreement between the parties about the sentence the defendant might face. This Court has yet to directly rule on the permissibility of these waivers, despite intense criticism, questionable legality, and inconsistent treatment by lower courts. Although appellate courts generally have enforced appeal waivers, the circuits have adopted different frameworks for determining their scope and validity. Amidst this confusion, serious questions remain about whether broad appeal waivers should be enforced at all, both because of their threat to the integrity of the judicial process and the inherently unknowing and involuntary nature of the forced, prospective relinquishment of challenges to yet-to-be-made errors and future rights violations. Thus, the question presented is: Are broad waivers of appellate rights lawful and, if so, what are the limits on their validity and enforcement? ii