Whether the Fifth Circuit contravened this Court's precedents in Buck, Miller-El, and Slack by first deciding the merits of Mr. Halprin's claims before determining the debatability of the district court's procedural rulings

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), this Court held, “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” /d. at 484. In Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003), this Court held “a court of appeals should not decline the application for a COA merely because it believes the applicant will not demonstrate an entitlement to relief,” 537 U.S. at 337, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had done just that, “sidestep[ping] th[e] process by first deciding the merits of an appeal, and then justifying its denial of a COA based on its adjudication of the actual merits.” Jd. at 336-37. In Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004), this Court found the Fifth Circuit had been “paying lipservice to the principles guiding issuance of a COA” before “proceed[ing] along a distinctly different track,” and “invoke[ing] its own restrictive gloss on” this Court’s cases to justify finding an issue not debatable. /d. at 283. In Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017), this Court held that, again, the Fifth Circuit had “phrased its determination in proper terms ... but it reached that conclusion only after essentially deciding the case on the merits,” in contravention of Miller-El. Id. at 773. In light of these decisions, the Fifth Circuit’s denial of Randy Halprin’s motion fora COA gives rise to the following questions: 1. Has the Fifth Circuit contravened Buck, Miller-El, and Slack by first deciding that Mr. Halprin’s claim under Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), did not suffice to show he is innocent of the death penalty and “thus conclud[ing] that jurists of reason would not debate the district court’s determination that Halprin’s Enmund/Tison claim is procedurally barred”? 2. Has the Fifth Circuit contravened Buck, Tennard, Miller-El, and Slack by holding Mr. Halprin’s claim under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), is not debatable because the Fifth Circuit alone has interpreted the Lockett line of cases “to apply to the exclusion of specific types of evidence rather than specific items of evidence’? 3. Has the Fifth Circuit contravened Buck, Tennard, Miller-El, and Slack by holding that only “post-AEDPA precedent” may be considered when deciding whether a state court unreasonably determined the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and the issue is not debatable although no other court has reached the same conclusion?