Whether the courts' below, in conflict with this Court's ruling in Chevron, erroneously held the lien valid even though when it was erroneously released, and took a year to reinstate, the period of limitation after assessment had already elapsed making the liens' reinstatement invalid and contrary to the plain language under Section 6325 (f) (2)?

question presented is: Whether the courts’ below, in ° conflict with this Court’s ruling in Chevron, erroneously held the lien valid even though when it was erroneously released, and took a year to reinstate, the period of limitation after assessment had already elapsed making the liens’ reinstatement invalid and contrary to the plain language under Section 6325 (f) (2)? II. | Absent contrary congressional intent, where the Advisory Committee Notes regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 1101 explains clearing this Supreme Court had determined a distinct difference between the phraseology of the various federal courts, claiming that a "district court of the United States" and a "United States District Court" as set by this Court, hold different meanings as set by the Advisory , Committee where this Supreme Court's power to make rules of practice and procedure extends. The act concerning civil actions, as amended in 1966, which refers to “the district courts * * * of the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and maritime cases. * * *” 28 U.S.C. i a . §2072, Pub. L. 89-773, §1, 80 Stat. 1323, contrary to the bankruptcy authorization for rules of practice and procedure “under the Bankruptcy Act.” 28 U.S.C. §2075, Pub. L. 88-623, §1, 78 Stat. 1001. The Bankruptcy Act in turn created bankruptcy courts called “the United States district courts and the district courts of the Territories and possessions to which this title is or may hereafter be applicable.” 11 U.S.C. §§1(10), 11(a), which provision applied also to criminal rules up to and including verdicts applies to “criminal cases and proceedings to punish for criminal contempt of court in the United States district courts, * * * and in proceedings before United States magistrates.” 18 U.S.C. §3771. As set by congressional usage the phrase “district courts of the United States,” without further qualification, traditionally included the district courts established by Congress in the states under Article III of the Constitution, which are “constitutional” courts, and has not included the territorial courts created under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, referred to as the “United States District Court,” which are “legislative” courts as held in this Court’s ruling in Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85 US. 648, 21 L. Ed. 966 (1873). If a United States District Court is legislative, then an appointed Article III judge becomes nothing more than a mere “commissioner,” and deprives a taxpayer of their rights to an Article III court as secured by the United States Constitution and this Court. Moreover, when lower courts hold a ruling of this Court, like Hornbuckle, or Congressional Acts, are “frivolous” and deprives a taxpayer of how the laws, or the federal courts apply to the law and understand the laws, it goes directly against this Court’s ruling in Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 498-499 (1937) ("The taxpayers were entitled to know the basis of law and fact on which the commissioner sought to sustain the deficiencies."). When Petitioners challenged the distinction of the various courts, relying on this Court’s rulings, the lower courts erroneously held the challenge was “frivolous,” and deprived any meaningful understanding of the laws and why or why not a “United States District Court” was legislative and not a constitution Article III court contrary to this Court’s holdings. The question presented is: Whether the lower courts erroneously hold the Petitioners’, as taxpayers, challenge that a “United States District Court” was a Article IV Legislative Court, and not a true “District Court of the United States” which is an Article III Constitutional Court, which made the appointed Article III judges merely commissioners, creating as biasness in favor of the IRS as “frivolous,” contrary to this Court’s ; . ruling in Hornbuckle and the Rules of Evidence as set by the Advisory ii an ; Committee’s Notes denied taxpayers a true understanding of the law and the varia