Was petitioner's consent to search following law enforcement agents' unconstitutional entry into the curtilage of his home sufficiently attenuated from the illegality to justify not applying the exclusionary rule?

QUESTION PRESENTED This case involves the attenuation doctrine set forth in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), in the context of consent to search given following a Fourth Amendment violation. Petitioner contends that inconsistencies in the case law applying Brown led the First Circuit Court of Appeals to incorrectly answer the following question: Question Presented: Was petitioner’s consent to search following law enforcement agents’ unconstitutional entry into the curtilage of his home sufficiently attenuated from the illegality to justify not applying the exclusionary rule when the agents admittedly knew they did not have probable cause to search the home or arrest the defendant, the agents entered by going through the locked driveway gate of an entirely fenced property, the agents did not leave when no one answered their knocks at the door, the agents continued to search behind a carport for the defendant, the agents lied to the defendant about the reason for their presence and obtained incriminating statements before admitting their true purpose, the agents separated the defendant from his companion before questioning him, and the agents obtained the consent within minutes after questioning petitioner in his home. ii