Does Illinois's SORA scheme constitute punishment that impinges the fundamental right of unfit defendants to be free from trial or sentencing, thus failing strict scrutiny?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW The circuit court ordered Juan Rodriguez—who suffers from significant mental and physical disabilities and was unfit to stand trial—to register as a “sex offender” under Illinois’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”). Under Illinois’s SORA scheme, child sex offenders may not reside within 500 feet of a “school, park, or playground” (730 ILCS 150/8 (2014)); must make frequent in-person trips to law enforcement agencies upon moving, purchasing a new vehicle, obtaining a new job, attending school, and opening a new email account (730 ILCS 150/3(a), (b), (c)(8), (c)(4) (2014)); and face criminal penalties for failing to comply with the statute (730 ILCS 150/8-5 (2014) (first violation of Illinois’ SORA is a Class 3 felony; second violation is a Class 2 felony)). Registrants have no mechanism to demonstrate that they should be exempt because they do not present a current danger of recidivism. Several jurisdictions have held that similar statutory schemes constitute punishment under Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (19638). See, e.g., Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016) (Michigan SORA); Doe v. State, 189 P.3d 999 (Alaska 2008); Starkey v. Okla. Dept. of Corrections, 305 P.3d 1004 (Okla. 2013); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4 (Me. 2009). The questions presented are: I. Does Illinois’s SORA scheme constitute punishment that impinges the fundamental right of unfit defendants to be free from trial or sentencing, thus failing strict scrutiny? II. Does Illinois’s SORA scheme’s application to unfit defendants unlikely to recidivate violate substantive due process, both facially under rational basis review and as applied to a defendant with significant cognitive defects? i