Does a person or entity lack standing to enforce a federal court's consent decree that includes an injunction if it was not a party to the original consent decree?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This Court says that “the scope of a consent decree must be discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it.” U.S. v. Armour, 402 U.S. 673, 682 (1971). This Court also says that “a well settled line of authority from this Court establishes that a consent decree is not enforceable directly or in collateral proceedings by those who are not parties to it, even though they were intended to be benefited by it.” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 750 (1975), citing, Armour, 402 U.S. 673, and Buckeye Co. v. Hocking Valley Co., 269 U.S. 42 (1925). The Sixth Circuit held that a consent decree issued by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan providing injunctive relief to a Plaintiff against Defendants and their successors and assigns could be enforced by a non-party assignee pursuant to Michigan state law allowing for free assignment of contracts. This conflicts with the holding of Armour requiring consent decrees be interpreted within their “four corners,” and also conflicts with the holding of Blue Chip Stamps, preventing enforcement of a consent decree by those who are not parties to it. The questions presented are: 1. Does a person or entity lack standing to enforce a federal court’s consent decree that includes an injunction if it was not a party to the original consent decree? 2. Did the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it held a federal court may go ii outside of the four corners of a consent decree to permit its assignment pursuant to state contract law to allow a non-party to enforce its terms?