Whether the generic term 'organization' in §666 should be construed to include quasi-sovereign public international entities like the United Nations

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioner Ng Lap Seng, a foreign national, was charged with bribing two foreign ambassadors to the United Nations to obtain “formal UN support” for a proposed UN conference center in Macau that Ng planned to build and donate to the UN for free. The government initially charged Ng under 18 U.S.C. §666, which criminalizes bribery of any agent of “an organization or ... a State, local or Indian tribal government” that receives federal funds. It then filed a superseding indictment that also charged Ng under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The Second Circuit affirmed Ng’s conviction under both statutes. As to §666, the Second Circuit held that the statutory term “organization” covers not only private organizations, but also quasi-sovereign public international bodies like the UN, despite the canon against construing generic terms to reach public bodies, Congress’ express coverage of intergovernmental entities in other Acts, and the obvious international comity concerns. And as to both statutes, the Second Circuit held that the “official act” limitation on federal bribery prosecutions that this Court recognized in McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016), simply does not apply to §666 and the FCPA. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the generic term “organization” in §666 should be construed to include quasi-sovereign public international entities like the United Nations. 2. Whether McDonnell’s official act requirement applies to §666 and FCPA prosecutions like this one and, if so, whether it was satisfied here.