Whether the FAA preempts a state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration agreements

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. That provision requires states to “place[] arbitration contracts ‘on equal footing with all other contracts.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 8S. Ct. 463, 468 (2015) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). The Supreme Court of Arkansas here refused to enforce hundreds of arbitration agreements. It improperly found that “the arbitration agreement was a separate contract from the admission agreement, regardless of whether it was incorporated into or operated as an addendum to the admissions agreement.” App., infra, 20a. Once separated, it misapplied well-established rules of contract interpretation to hold that the arbitration agreements did not apply to the residents, while still allowing the residents to pursue contract claims based on the validity of the underlying contract. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the FAA preempts a_ state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration agreements for invalidation because they were signed by family members or other persons for the benefit of the third-party residents now bringing the claims. 2. Whether the FAA preempts a_ state-law contract rule’ singling out arbitration agreements by imposing a “mutuality of ii obligation” requirement to them that is not a requirement for other contracts. 3. Whether the FAA preempts a_ state-law contract rule that singles out arbitration agreements due to lack of “mutuality of assent” because they were not signed by the party seeking to enforce it, when Arkansas law allows other contracts to be valid and enforceable without a signature based on other factors including actual performance.