Is it an unreasonable application of federal law to hold, for Strickland purposes, that there was no reasonable probability that the state's appellate court would have granted sentencing relief if asked, when the same appellate court, as a historical fact, actually granted sentencing relief without being asked?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Is it an unreasonable application of federal law to hold, for Strickland purposes, that there was no reasonable probability that the state’s appellate court would have granted sentencing relief if asked, when the same appellate court, as a historical fact, actually granted sentencing relief without being asked? 2. In reversing the district court’s grant of habeas relief, did the Seventh Circuit misidentify the state appellate court’s decision as one “not based on federal law,” although that state decision explicitly—though Strickland by concluding that there was no reasonable probability that the state’s appellate court would have granted sentencing relief if asked, when that same appellate court actually granted sentencing relief without even being asked?