Whether courts can evade their constitutional and statutory duty to review military decisions under the so-called 'Mindes test', or whether claims seeking injunctive relief against the military are reviewable so long as they do not present a nonjusticiable political question or otherwise fall outside the court's subject-matter jurisdiction

QUESTIONS PRESENTED On October 13, 2017, the U.S. Department of Defense departed from its longstanding practice and adopted a new policy requiring U.S. lawful permanent residents who enlist in the military—but not U.S. citizens—to await the results of certain background checks before beginning basic training. Petitioners challenged that policy under the Administrative Procedure Act, and the district court granted a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit reversed— not on the merits, but because it concluded that the Department of Defense’s policy was immune from judicial review. The Ninth Circuit did not rely on any constitutional or statutory provision limiting such review. Instead, the panel applied a judge-made test adopted in Mindes v. Seamen, to determine “when internal military affairs should [and should not] be subjected to court review.” 453 F.2d 197, 199 (5th Cir. 1971). The questions presented are: 1. Whether courts can evade their constitutional and statutory duty to review military decisions under the so-called “Mindes test,” or whether claims seeking injunctive relief against the military are reviewable so long as they do not present a nonjusticiable political question or otherwise fall outside the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. 2. Whether a DoD policy that requires all legal permanent resident enlistees—but not their U.S.citizen counterparts—to suffer unjustified delays before beginning their military careers is judicially reviewable.