William Johnson v. Paulding County, Georgia, et al.
SocialSecurity DueProcess FourthAmendment CriminalProcedure
Whether a State's statute of limitations bridling the pursuit of regress for UnConstitutional and illegal pre-trial imprisonment commences 48 hours after State imprisons a pre-trial detainee, or when the State releases that pre-trail detainee from jail
question presented is whether a State’s statute of limitations bridling the pursuit of regress for UnConstitutional and illegal pretrial imprisonment commences 48 hours after State imprisons a pre-trial detainee, or when the State releases that pre-trail detainee from jail. U.S.C.A. 4; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S.Ct. 911 (2017). Manuel v. City of Joliet, Illinois, 903 F.3d 667 (2018). The Trial Court’s and Appeals Court’s ruling as to such, herein, is in sharp contrast with this Supreme Court’s precedent and the Seventh Circuit’s precedent concerning such. Manuel and Manuel, supra. Herein, the Eleventh Circuit contends that the limitations clock in Georgia . is controlled by Georgia and starts ticking when Georgia says it does (currently 48 hours after pre-trial detention), while this Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have previously ruled that the clock does not start ticking until a detainee is released from jail and free from the State’s restraint so that the detainee is able and can sue his or her captors. 2. The question presented is whether the testimony within an affidavit of a verified complaint supporting facts asserted in the complaint should be considered as evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment. 3. This question presented is whether a county sheriff and his jailors can share their State’s cloak of Eleventh Amendment immunity for li ‘ blatant violations of the United States Constitution as controlled by 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 4. This question presented is whether, in current times of electronic filings and easy access to Court Records, a Court/Judge can refuse to take Judicial Notice of itsshis own Court records of a recent case over which the same Judge recently presided to justify the harsh dismissal of a poor pro se Plaintiffs Right to Jury Trial. 5. This question presented is whether a Court can demand highly strict adherence to rules and Court procedure so as to harshly dismiss a pauper pro se’s (with no formal law education) complaint for minor deficiencies, rather than first taking less extreme measures such as requiring the pro se litigant to re-file the pleadings to conform to the Court’s strict compliance policy. iii Proceedings Directly Related to the Case in this Court In the Federal District of Northern Georgia (Rome Division), case #:18-cv-00136-HLM, captioned: Johnson v. County of Paulding, Georgia et al. 1. Complaint with Jury Demand: Docket #1, judgment entered on 10/31/2018; 2. First Motion to Dismiss with Brief in Support : filed by all Defendants: Docket #8, judgment entered on 10/31/2018; 3. First Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all Defendats: Docket # 9, judgment entered on 10/31/2018; : 4, Response in Opposition to First Motion to Dismiss: Docket # 11, judgment entered on 10/31/2018; 5. Response in Opposition to First Motion for Summary Judgment: Docket # 12, judgment entered on 10/31/2018; 6. Response to Statement of Material Facts of First Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff: Docket # 18, judgment entered on 10/31/2018; 7. Reply Brief to Response to First Motion to Dismiss by all Defendants: Docket # 14, judgment entered on 10/31/2018; 8. Reply Brief to Response to First Motion for Summary Judgment: Docket # 15, judgment entered on 10/31/2018; 9. Notice of Appeal: Docket # 20. . In the United States Court, of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, case # 18-14994 captioned: William Johnson v. Paulding County, Georgia, et al. iv 1. Appellant’s Brief docketed on 11/30/2018, _ judgment rendered 7/12/2019; 2. Appellees’ Brief filed on 3/15/2019, judgment rendered 7/12/2019; 3. Reply Brief filed by Appellant on 5/20/2019, judgment rendered 7/12/2019; 4. Petition for Rehearing En Banc filed by Appellant on 8/2/2019, judgment rendered 10/4/2019.