Whether a church's First Amendment rights are violated when, under the guise of 'neutral principles,' a civil magistrate selects the leadership of the church in violation of that church's doctrine, custom, and practice?

QUESTION PRESENTED It is well settled that the First Amendment Religion Clauses robustly protect the freedom of a Church to govern itself according to religious law and practices. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94 (1952). The lower courts, however, continue to find imaginative but doctrinally incorrect justifications for departing from the Court’s teaching on this important constitutional question. See, eg., Roman Catholic Archdiocese of San Juan, Puerto Rico v. Feliciano, 589 U.S. _ (2020), 140 S.Ct. 696 (per curiam). The persistence of these cases is attributable, in large measure, to the need for this Court to reaffirm, renew, and apply the principles established in Kedroffto the current generation of controversies around religious freedom. The instant case presents such an opportunity. Here, the Pennsylvania court, having once recognized that the core dispute was about the leadership of a church, nevertheless reversed course and resurrected an order it previously had vacated as ultra vires, essentially now directing that a non-member of a religious community be installed in the highest leadership position of the Church, displacing its duly elected leader. Against that backdrop, the case below presents the following issue for plenary review: Whether a church’s First Amendment rights are violated when, under the guise of “neutral principles,” a civil magistrate selects the leadership of the church in violation of that church’s doctrine, custom, and practice?