No. 19-1277

David Thorpe v. Dexter Dumas, et al.

Lower Court: Eleventh Circuit
Docketed: 2020-05-12
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Relisted (2)
Tags: 42-usc-1983 absolute-immunity administrative-acts civil-rights due-process investigative-acts probable-cause prosecutorial-immunity prosecutorial-misconduct qualified-immunity section-1983
Key Terms:
SocialSecurity DueProcess FourthAmendment
Latest Conference: 2021-01-08 (distributed 2 times)
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether a supervising Deputy District Attorney who assigned three (4) District Attorneys over a two-year period to a case that lacked probable cause (per discovery) to prosecute was entitled to absolute immunity under 42 U.S.C § 1983?

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

Questions Presented A ~ Willis Burns v. Reed. 500 U.S 478 (1991) Supreme Court states “prosecutors have only qualified immunity for investigative acts. Buckly v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) when a prosecutor is alleged to have fabricated evidence. the prosecutor is engaged in an investigative task not a prosecutorial task. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (1997) filling out and submitting the certificate or affidavit. This is investigative in nature and therefore. is protected by only qualified immunity. Jmbler v. Pactmen 424 U.S. 409 (1976) the Supreme Court articulated distinction : between absolute immunity for prosecutorial acts and qualified immunity for investigative or administrative acts ... Question 1. Whether a supervising Deputy District Attorney who assigned three (4) District Attorneys over a two-vear period to a case that lacked probable cause (per discovery) to prosecute was entitled to absolute immunity under 42 U.S.C § 1983? Question 2. Whether the lower courts biasly abused their discretion by intentionally mischaracterizing the duties of a supervising Deputy District Attorney? Question 3. Whether the 11th Circuit Court of | Appeals Court with disturbing ease exploited their discretion by failing to mention the true context of the Petitioners statements. Said statement being “knew of exculpatory evidence and failed to act” by 1 y continuing a prosecution for 26 months. Willis “knew” was not supported by the Constitution or the Bar Associations Rules of Conduct and Ethics or acknowledge Willis was an never the prosecuting attorney. Question 4. Whether the lower courts abused their discretion by biasly revisiting a judgment of another court and applied it to this unique case? B (1)Respondents, Boone, Connelly, Dumas, Jenkins German AFA and Trust Co. v. Rigsby (7) Cir. 2015.) Seventh circuit relied on the rule that “a defendant will waive objection to the absence of personal jurisdiction by giving the plaintiff a “reasonable expectation” that she “will defend the suit on the merits.” 2015 WL 5579751. at *2. Lewkowicz v. Williams, 630 F. 8d, defendant nevertheless waived its personal jurisdiction defense by failing to press it and. instead, substantially litigating on the merits. Gerber v. Riordan 649 F. 3d 514, 518 (6"" Cir. 2011). defendants participated in litigating on the merits before renewing their motion. which included their counsel making a general appearance, the defendants waived their personal jurisdiction defense. Hamilton v. Atlas 197 F. 3d, 58, 60 (24 Cir. 1999). A “delay in challenging personal jurisdiction by motion to dismiss may result in waiver, even where ... the defense was asserted in a timely answer.” Cont’ Bank, N.A. v. Meyer. 10 F.8d 12938, 1297 (7 Cir. 1993) Nonetheless, some courts have held that a defendant ii can waive the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction by its later conduct in the litigation. Question 1. Whether the rulings by the 7'», 6", and 2nd Circuits should serve as an established guideline for Respondents who have received a reasonably calculated notification to defend a suit and make general appearances and litigate. Nonetheless attempt to under mind said notice by hiding behind a rule that is secondary to the concept it is predicated on (which is notification and an opportunity to respond)? Question 2. Whether the lower courts abused their discretion by purposely not taking into consideration that the Respondent's motions (District court documents 9.13.16. and 22) substantially litigated every defense from expiration of the statute of limitations. to sovereignty, and immunities? Question 3. Whether the lower courts abused their discretion by not considering the Petitioners amended complaints first page statement “Plaintiff seeks to amend the original complaint to assist and clarify statements and claims” as a reasonable expectation that Respondents would defend the lawsuit? B (2)Respondents, Boone, Connelly, Dumas, Jenkins Petitioner states “there is a con

Docket Entries

2021-01-11
Rehearing DENIED.
2020-12-02
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/8/2021.
2020-10-30
Petition for Rehearing filed.
2020-10-05
Petition DENIED.
2020-07-01
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 9/29/2020.
2020-06-11
Brief of respondent Dexter Dumas in opposition filed.
2020-01-21
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due June 11, 2020)

Attorneys

David Thorpe
David Thorpe — Petitioner
Dexter Dumas
Reginald Charles MartinCity of Atlanta - Department of Law, Respondent