Whether the court of appeals properly deferred to the agency's informal views under Skidmore, without finding the statute ambiguous or applying (much less exhausting) traditional interpretive tools

QUESTION PRESENTED The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the issuance of tax-exempt bonds to finance “qualified highway or surface freight transfer facilities.” 26 U.S.C. §142(a)(15). That term is defined, in relevant part, to mean “any surface transportation project which receives Federal assistance under title 23.” Id. §142(m)(1)(A). The Department of Transportation has taken the position that a facility is a project “which receives Federal assistance under title 23” so long as it “benefits from” federal Title 23 expenditures, even if the facility does not receive, has never received, and is not even eligible to receive such assistance. In this case, the court of appeals deferred to the Department of Transportation’s view under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The court did not, however, find that the statute was ambiguous or discuss the meaning of the statutory term “receives” before doing so. The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals properly deferred to the agency’s informal views under Skidmore, without finding the statute ambiguous or applying (much less exhausting) traditional interpretive tools. (i)