Willfulness & Good-faith

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, : under 7 U.S.C. § 21, has delegated limited powers to the National Futures Association. The NFA is a nongovernmental, industry-operated, self-regulatory : organization. According to the NFA, Mr. Féjokwu “willfully violated” NFA Rule 2-5: Cooperation in NFA Investigations and Proceedings. NFA alleges Féjokwu’s “willful” violation arose . by his "willfully" failing to fully cooperate with an NFA investigation because although he otherwise fully cooperated and acted in good-faith, he "willfully" questioned, and "willfully" sought clarification regarding the relevance of one document among scores that NFA requested him to produce. NFA permanently barred Féjokwu from the : commodities industry and by extension the entire finance industry — not just in the USA but worldwide. : CFTC rubber-stamped the draconian penalty and the Third Circuit affirmed. There is a large circuit split on the issue of illogical coexistence of “willfulness” and good-faith and this especially justifies this Court’s urgent resolution. Additionally, this case exceptionally cries for this Court’s intervention given that these issues affect theoretically millions of entities — across numerous industries — regulated by government , agencies and their private delegates. Further adding to the exceptional importance of the issues coalesced in this case, is the fact that the significant adverse effects of these issues on regulatees domiciled in the USA painfully reverberates for these individuals not just in the USA but globally. i The questions presented are: 1. Willfulness & Good-faith: This Court held in Taggart, that "willfulness” requires “no fair ; ground of doubt” and in both Safeco and : McLaughlin, that “willfulness” requires measures of bad-faith or recklessness. A 5-2 circuit split ; exists over the illogical coexistence of “willfulness” and good-faith. There is a 7-3 circuit split on whether “willfulness” allows for a “reasonable good-faith defense”. The 3"¢ Circuit has held that “willfulness” imposes “strict liability’. Does “willfulness” require “bad-faith”’, “no fair ground of doubt”, and “recklessness” in the civil regulatory context? 2. Delegated Powers: An agency delegated limited authority to an SRO. The agency’s powers allow ; its congressionally confirmed commissioners to subpoena documents. The subpoenas are contestable and enforceable only by the judiciary. The regulatee cannot be held liable for : contestation. Conversely, the SRO can demand documents without subpoena and without a priori judicial adjudication. Is it impermissible for an : SRO to assert greater power than the agency from which its power derives? 3. Due-process: For weeks, the regulatee in goodfaith cooperated with the SRO’s unannounced examination. For weeks, the SRO ignored the regulatee’s clarification requests on the legitimacy of a document request. The agency can issue subpoenas, subject to a priori judicial adjudication. The SRO does not refer the case to the agency. A complaint is filed by the SRO 26-days before the deadline. Is this a violation of the regulatee’s protections under the Fifth Amendment? iii ; The essence of this case as distilled in the questions presented above is simple, urgent, and critically important. Will the NFA empowered by the rubber-stamp of : the CFTC, and the acquiescence and imprimatur of ce federal courts in the name of “agency deference” be . allowed to continue to function as a supreme power unto itself — by using its Rule 2-5 “Failure to Cooperate”, as a catchall, omnipotent, limitless . weapon to target and destroy parties the NFA simply does not like or wants out of their club, without any. pretense of due-process, fairness, or justice? . Is the NFA the Supreme Court of the United States of America or is this Court, the Supreme Court of the United States of America? : * * * Féjokwu, pro se, respectfully requests that the reviewing Justices of the Court do not reflexively