Whether Lafler v. Cooper announced a new rule not dictated by prior precedent, and whether its 'reasonable possibility' standard applies where a defendant maintains innocence but would have perjured himself to accept a plea

Questions Presented Respondent maintained his innocence before trial, and testified at the evidentiary hearing ordered by the Michigan Supreme Court on his collateral attack of his conviction that he was innocent of the charge and did not kill the victim, but that if he had known of a plea offer he would have perjured himself to take the plea. Michigan has no “Alford” plea procedure, and requires a defendant pleading guilty to establish a factual basis of guilt under oath. When Respondent pled after the prosecution was ordered to re-offer the plea he in fact said under oath that he did commit the murder, contradicting his evidentiary hearing testimony, just as he said he would. The questions presented are: I. Respondent’s conviction was final when Lafler v. Cooper was decided. Did Lafler announce a new rule, one not dictated by prior precedent, so as not to be applicable retroactively on collateral attack? II. If Lafler is retroactive on collateral attack, Michigan has no “Alford plea” procedure, and requires that a plea be taken under oath. Where a defendant maintains his innocence to his counsel both before trial and at a collateral-attack Lafler evidentiary hearing, testifying at the hearing that though he is innocent he would have perjured himself at a plea proceeding to take advantage of a plea offer, is Lafler’s “reasonable possibility that the defendant would have accepted the plea” standard applicable? -i III. Do the facts of this case demonstrate the flaws in Lafler and its unworkability, so that it should be reconsidered and overruled? -ii