Whether the Sixth Amendment requires a state to impanel a jury to determine the offense-related facts which establish a criminal defendant's earliest parole date

QUESTION PRESENTED In Michigan’s “indeterminate” sentencing scheme, judgments of sentence contain two numbers: the minimum number of years the defendant will have to serve before becoming eligible for parole, and the maximum number of years that he or she could be incarcerated without parole. Under Michigan law, the second number is fixed by the statutory penalty for the crime. The first, however, is determined in reference to statutory sentencing guidelines. This Court has held that increasing the second number—the maximum sentence—by reference to facts not found by a jury violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. But this Court has also held that the first number—a convict’s early release date—is not subject to that provision. In People v. Lockridge, the Michigan Supreme Court invalidated this state’s sentencing guidelines statute—which pertains only to the first number—because the guidelines operate off judge-found, rather than jury-found, facts. The court grounded its 2015 decision in this Court’s Sixth Amendment sentencing jurisprudence: Alleyne v. U.S., Apprendi v. New Jersey, and U.S. v. Booker. The question presented is whether—in determining the offense-related facts which establish a criminal defendant’s earliest parole date—the Sixth Amendment requires a state to impanel a jury.