Does the limitations period for a §1983 claim that necessarily implicates a criminal conviction accrue when a prisoner is released from custody, as four circuits hold, or when the ex-prisoner persuades either a governor to pardon him or a state court to overturn his conviction, as seven circuits, including the lower court, hold?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), held that, to prevent circumvention of habeas corpus’s statutory exhaustion of state remedies requirement, a prisoner cannot bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 that necessarily implicates his criminal conviction, unless and until that conviction is “favorably terminated.” Since Heck, the circuits have hopelessly split, and this Court has been internally divided, on whether this favorable termination rule continues to bar accrual of §1983 claims after a prisoner has been released from custody and habeas is no longer available. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 752 n.2 (2004) (acknowledging it is unsettled whether release from custody “dispense[s] with the Heck requirement”). The questions presented are: 1. Does the limitations period for a §1983 claim that necessarily implicates a criminal conviction accrue when a prisoner is released from custody, as four circuits hold, or when the ex-prisoner persuades either a governor to pardon him or a state court to overturn his conviction, as seven circuits, including the lower court, hold? 2. Does extending Heck’s favorable termination rule to ex-prisoners who lack access to a federal remedy violate the rule of Patsy v. Board of Regents of State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982), which prohibits a judicially imposed exhaustion of state remedies requirement for §1983 claims? 3. When extended to ex-prisoners, does Heck’s favorable termination rule, which is satisfied by ii a gubernatorial pardon that can be perpetually pursued, imprudently eliminate the finality otherwise afforded §1983 defendants by statutes of limitations and preclusion doctrines?