Can a petitioning litigant be held liable for their adversary's litigation costs and attorney's fees based upon a punitive statute, where the litigant files a 'pure petition' to redress grievances of public concern, and their litigation is not a 'sham?'

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW The First Amendment right to petition clause contains a heightened standard precluding liability when a citizen exercises his/her right to bring suit over issues of public concern. Under that standard, the filing of a well-founded lawsuit may not be punished where objectively it is determined to be founded upon some statutory and/or other legally recognized basis, even where his/her suit is brought for some improper purpose [Bill Johnson Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 US. 731, 740-43, 103 S.Ct. 2161 (1983); Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 58, 113 S.Ct. 1920 (1993); BE&K Construction, Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 536 U.S. 516, 525, 528-37, 122 S.Ct. 2390 (2002)]. But this case addresses an issue left open by this Court in BE&K. Can attorney’s fees rules/statutes be used to penalize a “pure petition” (meaning a citizen’s lawsuit directly against a local government for declaratory and injunctive relief to redress grievances)? Here the Nevada Supreme Court held in the affirmative, punishing Petitioner through use of a statute that Court characterized as “fee-shifting.” Thus the following questions: 1. May a petitioning litigant be held liable for his/her adversary’s litigation costs and attorney’s fees based upon a punitive statute, where the litigant files a “pure petition” to redress grievances of public concern, and his/her litigation is not a “sham?” li QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW — Continued 2. Should cases such as Premier Electric Construction Company v. National Electric Contractors Association, Inc., 814 F.2d 358, 378 (7th Cir. 1987) and Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 USS. 545, 554-57, 134 S.Ct. 1749 (2014), which approve of true “fee-shifting” statutes that trump petitioning immunity, be limited to lawsuits that do not directly involve local government nor seek redress of public grievances? If so, should cases such as Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.4th 53, 62, 52 P.3d 685 (2002), Vargas v. City of Salinas, 200 Cal.App.4th 1331, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 244 (2001), and this one, be overruled/vacated? ili RULE 14.1(b) STATEMENT A list of all parties to the court proceeding whose judgment is the subject of this Petition, is as follows: Petitioner, Aaron L. Katz Respondent, Incline Village General Improvement District, the Board of Trustees, who are: Kendra Wong; Sara Schmitz; Peter Morris; Matthew Dent; Tim Callicrate iv LIST OF RELATED CASES Katz v. Incline Village General Improvement District, No. 70440, Supreme Court of Nevada, Judgment entered February 26, 2018 Vargas v. City of Salinas, No. $140911, Supreme Court of California, Judgment entered June 17, 2009 Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., No. S$094877, Supreme Court of California, Judgment entered August 29, 2002 Premier Electric Construction Company v. National Electric Contractors Association, Inc., No. 86-1935, 862035, and 86-2036, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Judgment entered April 23, 1987 Clackamas County, Oregon Mitchell v. Clackamas River Water, No. 157776, Court of Appeals of Oregon, Judgment entered August 24, 2016 City of Aurora v. 1405 Hotel, LLC, No. 14CA2328, Colorado Court of Appeals, Judgment entered April 7, 2016