Whether the PLCAA's predicate exception encompasses alleged violations of broad, generally applicable state statutes

QUESTION PRESENTED The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”) “generally preempts claims against manufacturers and sellers of firearms and ammunition resulting from the criminal use of those products.” Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the PLCAA provides an exception for “action[s] in which a manufacturer or seller of a [firearm or ammunition] knowingly violated a State or Federal statute applicable to the sale or marketing of the product.” 15 U.S.C. §7903(5)(A)(iii). “This exception has come to be known as the ‘predicate exception.” Jleto, 565 F.3d at 1182. Crucially, this predicate exception enumerates examples of covered statutes, and these examples specifically regulate the firearms industry. 15 U.S.C. § 7903(5)(A) Gii)(D-(ID. The Connecticut Supreme Court below held that the PLCAA’s predicate exception encompasses all general statutes merely capable of being applied to firearms sales or marketing. In contrast, both the Second and Ninth Circuits have rejected this broad interpretation of the predicate exception, which would swallow the PLCAA’s immunity rule. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384, 402-403 (2d Cir. 2008); Ileto, 565 F.3d at 1134, 1186. And the Ninth Circuit interpreted the predicate exception even more narrowly than the Second Circuit. See ibid. The question presented is whether the PLCAA’s predicate exception encompasses alleged violations of broad, generally applicable state statutes, such as the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act, which forbids “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b(a). (i)