Whether the DVPA's residual clause definition of 'abuse' is unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This case presents serious First Amendment prior restraint issues. It has long been established that a prior restraint comes to the Court “with a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” (Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584 (1963)). Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996)). California’s Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA”) grants unbridled discretion to courts to restrain a person from free speech regarding the case, and, restrain him from filing legal actions simply because they emotionally upset his opponent in litigation. In the present case, the courts below held that a man’s pending and past civil litigation against his exwife (and ex-business partner) is domestic violence “abuse”, “irrespective of whether the cases have any merit.” Also upheld is an injunction prohibiting the publication of “any discovery documents received”; and an “absolute” prohibition against contacting “business : associates” who are necessary trial witnesses and codefendants. , The lower courts rejected a strict scrutiny analysis, claiming it to be unnecessary merely because the power of restraint is granted under a California domestic violence statute. These findings are in conflict with the great body of First Amendment law, yet are the predictable ; consequences of the challenged statute’s vague residual clause definition of “abuse”, which controlling case : law interprets to mean “any conduct that destroys ii the mental or emotional calm” of the other person. The questions presented are as follows: 1. Is the DVPA’s severable residual clause definition of “abuse” unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad? 2. Is the “abuse” definition in-conflict with the right to petition? . 8. May a prior restraint issued under the DVPA be upheld without being subjected to strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring? 4. Do the controlling Nadkarni case and its progeny comprise an unconstitutional line of cases violating separation of powers and/or federal supremacy by carving out a “California family member” exception to the First Amendment?