Whether the appellate court below erroneously held, in conflict with the decisions of this Court, and in a three-way split with the Third Circuit and Seventh Circuit, that the Plaintiff's injury to business and property in the United States resulting from RICO violations including extortion, mail fraud, and aiding & abetting is insufficient to satisfy the domestic injury requirement

QUESTION PRESENTED Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 and the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 to protect civilians from collections of unlawful debts, including extortion and fraudulent activities, by criminal enterprises. In Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Corp (1985) this Court held that a plaintiff can bring a private cause of action for racketeering patterns, specifically including wire and mail fraud. In Nabisco vs. European Community (2016) this Court further clarified that RICO applies extraterritorially for private civil claims to domestic damages to business and property in the United States. In Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, F.3d _, 2018 US. App. Lexis 27433 (3d Cir. Sept. 26, 2018) the Third Circuit applied domestic injury to the location of the property. Meanwhile, in Armada (Singapore) PTE Ltd. v. Amcol International, 885 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 2018) the Seventh Circuit applied domestic injury to the location of the plaintiff’s residence. In the instant case, the Second Circuit created a three-way circuit split by focusing on where the injury (predicate act) originated. The question presented is: Whether the appellate court below erroneously held, in conflict with the decisions of this Court, and in a threeway split with the Third Circuit and Seventh Circuit, that the Plaintiff's injury to business and property in the United States resulting from RICO violations including extortion, , mail fraud, and aiding & abetting is insufficient to satisfy the domestic injury requirement.