Does the Federal Arbitration Act allow state courts to construe the Congressional policy to incorporate or accommodate inherent inequality to parties by allowing for the dispensing with arbitrability and contract construction?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW QUESTION 1: Does it violate the Federal Arbitration Act or otherwise undermine “equal footing” and contract immunities when State Courts construe the Congressional policy to incorporate or _ accommodate inherent inequality to parties by allowing for the dispensing with arbitrability and contract construction” so that it further allows for arbitrary state created discretionary rules that affords the ‘bundling’ of each and every claim and counterclaim that arises out of court process itself: to also be part and parcel of the -“all” the claimspresumably fit for the arbitrational forum? QUESTION 2: The litigation challenges jurisdiction by conditions precedent and Supreme Court , precedents of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 187 (1803) to Steel City Steel Co. v.Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998); and on to invoking a similar anomaly of Article III jurisdiction, as ; alerted in Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007). In light of this Court’s holding in Hilot v. Piersol, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828) and other Supreme Court. jurisdictional precedents: Does the fact that the record plausibly holds that there is unproven grounds of all elements of the arbitrator's jurisdiction; and the court ordering arbitration neverthelessthereby sets the arbitrator up for civil ; charges in a separate cause of action for imposition and plausibly being a “trespasser’if his jurisdiction is not proved upon the record with sufficiency to standards and due process? QUESTION 3: The litigation charges the Alabama . 1 State Courts to be making per se rules of conventionthat clash with Supreme Court precedents and . also federal and state court precedents. Mandamus . was petitioned, seeing that such process appeared to be void on its face and would deny an appeal. Assuming the aforesaid is plausible-the question is: Would the State actually further the alleged errorunto violating the 14% Amendment and the Civil Rights Statutes if the Courts construe the FAA to afford discretion to deny inalienable liberties of equal benefit of arbitration agreements and inherent immunities of freedom from oppressive forces of such contract and court adjudications, when fraud is alleged to induce the arbitration and fraud is further alleged to maintain the status quo of parties before the Courts after rulings are made? QUESTION 4: The litigation invokes the due : process requirement of having a fair Judge under : the Constitutional scrutiny of Tumev v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). The litigation also shows the Courts to perceive a view that the FAA inherently preempts any substantial due process inquiry and that the Federal law demands arbitration on any and all issues that may arise in whatever form or fashion. Underscoring Tumey’s common law right to a fair Judgethe question is! Does the FAA allows or otherwise requires the abridgement and/or a specialized reformulation of the Alabama or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by a State or Federal Court, so that the Court may vary the due process, the procedural standards and further discount having the appearance of bias; thereby promoting a clash with or showing inherent u conflict with 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (b) and its Alabama ; counterpart in Al. Code § 12-2-7 (4)(2014)? The interested Parties are once again the Plaintiffs of official record. The Plaintiff Parties interested are enlarged for the grave implications to Citizens of other Stateswhom the Plaintiffs believe are unconstitutionally burden and abridged of rights, as asserted in the record. The Interested Parties are again the AT&T defendants et, al; but such has been enlarged to officially include Corporation Trust Company[CT], whom Judge McMillan made a party to the arbitration, which the Plaintiffs contend was but an unwarranted prejudice to all Plaintiffs and potential Class Plaintiffs in other States. The quasi court defendant in the Dallas County Circuit Court, the recused Judge Donald L. McMillan Jr. and the petitioned to be recused Ju