Whether due process can abide a system in which one level of due process is accorded the bank and another level of due process is accorded the borrower

QUESTION PRESENTED On April 7, 2015, in a frenzied Florida rocket docket at which 50-60 contested and uncontested cases presented for trial, a judgment of foreclosure was entered against Petitioner Hart in favor of Respondent Wells Fargo for a loan which never closed, for which the note and mortgage Hart had signed in anticipation the loan would close were recorded in error, for which none of the payees listed on the proposed HUD-1 were paid and for which Wells Fargo perpetrated a fraud on the court to deceive the court into concluding the loan had been funded. In this trial, Wells Fargo had offered up deceptive releases to show the loan was funded, never disclosed on Wells Fargo’s exhibit list. One was a release Wells Fargo knew had been rescinded as issued in error. Another was a release Wells Fargo knew was unrelated to this purported loan. On Wells Fargo’s exhibit list, it had disclosed the note and mortgage as documents it intended to introduce at trial as Florida law requires that a judgment of foreclosure be supported at trial by competent, substantial evidence, and that said note and mortgage must be introduced and admitted at trial. In this case, neither were introduced much less admitted at trial and the only note and mortgage in the trial record is for a loan between a Phyllis Savage and Bank of America. Hart filed a motion for a new trial and his new attorney filed an amended motion for new trial and a motion for leave to file omitted counterclaim. After the successor judge initially agreed to hold a hearing on Hart’s pro se motion, the court denied all motions and abruptly cancelled the hearing denying Hart an opportunity to be heard. The question presented is whether due process can abide a ii system in which, as will be seen, one level of due process is accorded the bank and another level of due process is accorded the borrower.