Whether the Commissioner of Social Security can impose monetary sanctions on a disability benefits recipient for failing to report unpaid volunteer work, even though the Social Security Act prohibits using such work activity as evidence that the recipient is no longer disabled

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioner Michelle Valent performed unpaid volunteer work for her brother’s veterans organization while receiving disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. The Commissioner of Social Security punished Ms. Valent’s failure to report this work with $126,210 in monetary sanctions. The Commissioner acted under his authority to sanction persons who fail to disclose facts that they “know[] or should know” are “material to the determination of any initial or continuing right to” disability benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a8(a)(1)(C). The Commissioner concluded that Ms. Valent should have known that her work activity was “material” to her continuing right to receive disability benefits, even though the Act forbade the Commissioner from using Ms. Valent’s “work activity ... as evidence that” she was “no longer disabled.” Id. § 421(m)(1)(B). By a divided vote, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, deferring to the Commissioner’s interpretation of the Act under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The questions presented are: 1. Whether the Court should overrule Chevron. 2. Whether Chevron requires courts to defer to an agency’s resolution of a conflict between statutory provisions. 3. Whether the Court should summarily reverse the decision below, because the Sixth Circuit ii violated SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), by affirming an administrative order based on an allegation that the agency decisionmaker rejected as unsupported by the evidence and that the Commissioner concedes was not a basis for the order. iii RULE 14.1(b)(iii) STATEMENT No proceedings in state or federal court are directly related to this case.