No. 19-224

Bryan James Strother v. David S. Baldwin, Adjutant General, California Army National Guard, et al.

Lower Court: Ninth Circuit
Docketed: 2019-08-20
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Relisted (2)
Tags: accrued-benefits civil-rights contractual-entitlements due-process federal-tort-claims-act federal-torts-claim-act feres-doctrine military-benefits military-pay military-pay-and-bonuses property-rights repetition-evading-review vested-property-interests vested-property-rights
Key Terms:
SocialSecurity DueProcess FourthAmendment Securities JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2020-02-21 (distributed 2 times)
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether accrued military pay and bonuses are vested property entitlements or unilateral gratuities

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This Petition seeks to endrecoupment of accrued benefits, pay and bonus monies which are honorably earned in good faith and overturn the Feres doctrine. Even in cases of court-martial this Nation’s Article III courts have consistently held that accrued and vested U.S. Military pay is textually committed property’. Yet U.S. Military personnel are routinely subjected to recoupment of accrued property, including bonus monies offered in enlistment contracts. This Court has defined plain language on multiple occasions and the Feres doctrine conflicts with all of them: In regard to U.S. service personnel the Feres doctrine has single-handedly managed to undermined the plain language of the Federal Torts Claim Act (FCTA) leading to a host of absurd consequences and confusion. I. Regardless of the presence or absence of any statutory scheme do enlistment contracts become entitlements vested upon commitment at the decision point United States v. Larionoff, 481 U.S. 864, (1977) or are they unilateral gratuities non-binding upon the United States Department of Defense and its Branches. II. There is zero statutory authority or legislative intent to support the Feres doctrine notion of "incident to service" exception. It came out of thin air to usurp the plain language of the FTCA and should be invalidated in favor of new rule in line with 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (j) (k). 1 U. S. v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 869 (1977), Bell v. U.S. , 366 393, 401 (1961), In re Grimley, 187 U.S. 147, 151-152 (1890), Costello v. U. S. 587 F.2d 424, (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc). -iiQUESTIONS PRESENTED-continued III. Courts and litigants are not reading or following the plain language of the second sentence of F.R.C.P. 9 (b) and contrary judgments, opinions and usage in pleadings about the rule leads to error and uncertainty. V. Were Respondents given fair notice of Petitioners 42 U.S.C. §1983 14 Amendment “Property Interest” Claim, which would allow nominal damages in addition to punitive damages. IV. This case is a classic example of a case being capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.

Docket Entries

2020-02-24
Rehearing DENIED.
2020-02-05
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 2/21/2020.
2020-01-30
2020-01-13
Petition DENIED.
2019-12-04
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/10/2020.
2019-12-04
Reply of petitioner Bryan Strother filed.(Distributed)
2019-11-20
Brief of respondents United States, et al. in opposition filed.
2019-10-18
Motion to extend the time to file a response from October 21, 2019 to November 20, 2019, submitted to The Clerk.
2019-10-18
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is further extended to and including November 20, 2019.
2019-09-11
Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including October 21, 2019.
2019-09-10
Motion to extend the time to file a response from September 19, 2019 to October 21, 2019, submitted to The Clerk.
2019-08-16
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due September 19, 2019)

Attorneys

Bryan Strother
Daniel C. WillmanLaw Office Daniel C. Wllman, Petitioner
Daniel C. WillmanLaw Office Daniel C. Wllman, Petitioner
United States
Noel J. FranciscoSolicitor General, Respondent
Noel J. FranciscoSolicitor General, Respondent