Whether the Army's Sexual Harassment Assault Response and Prevention Program (SHARP) reversed the constitutional presumption of innocence

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW I. Whether the Army’s Sexual Harassment Assault Response and Prevention Program (SHARP) reversed the constitutional presumption of innocence, diluted the “guilty beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof in criminal prosecutions, violated Fundamental Due Process, and disregarded the Sixth Amendment’s guaranty of a full and fair trial. II. Whether the trial court, conditioned by the SHARP program’s reversal of the presumption of innocence, deprived Petitioner of his Constitutional Right to Fundamental Due Process where it allowed 13 instances of serious prosecutorial misconduct, to include making material misrepresentations in open court about digital images with which the prosecution tampered and on which the prosecution relied at trial, which further deprived Petitioner of the ability to put on a complete defense. III. Whether the trial court, influenced by the SHARP program’s degradation of the presumption of innocence, wrongly admitted an unsigned, undated, typed copy of an “apology” letter introduced as uncharged misconduct to prove Petitioner may have assaulted his spouse and the purported victim a decade earlier, and hearsay testimony of her mother describing a graphic and degrading sexual assault of her daughter, which she did not witness. IV. Whether the Army Court, predisposed to affirming guilt due to the SHARP program, misapplied its 10 U.S.C. § 866 plenary de novo i jurisdiction when it declined to weigh the credibility of the complaining witness, where the record was replete with indications of her lack of candor and untrustworthiness, in violation of this Court’s precedent in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 31819 (1979) (standard for sufficiency of evidence to support conviction). V. Whether the Army Court, oriented to affirming guilt due to the SHARP program, failed to follow Sixth Amendment Supreme Court precedent when it declined to factor into its ineffective assistance of counsel analysis the trial judge’s having found 12 instances where trial defense counsel did not exercise reasonable due diligence to uncover and develop exonerating and mitigating evidence. ii