Whether the emergency-aid exception permits a warrantless, nonconsensual search of a private home based upon officers' inability to 'rule out the possibility' that someone inside the home may be in need of aid

QUESTION PRESENTED The “physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 578, 585 (1980)). At the same time, the “Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978). There is widespread disagreement among the lower courts over the standards for proper application of this “emergency aid” exception to the warrant requirement. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit held that a warrantless, nonconsensual search of a home is legal under the emergency-aid exception if officers are unable to “rule out the possibility” that a person within the home is in need of aid prior to the search. App., infra, 6a, 13a-14a. Under this standard, courts focus not on the facts known to the officers, but instead on facts they “couldn’t have known,” and “were not sure” about, and “had no idea” about. App., infra, 12a-14a. Other courts have expressly rejected that approach, holding that a “possibility” based on unknown facts is insufficient to justify a warrantless and nonconsensual home search. These courts require that there be specific, affirmative facts indicating that an emergency is at hand and their assistance is immediately needed. The question presented is whether the emergencyaid exception permits a warrantless, nonconsensual search of a private home based upon officers’ inability to “rule out the possibility” that someone inside the home may be in need of aid.