Whether section 1252(g) is unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause as applied to Petitioners

QUESTION PRESENTED Petitioners are Iraqis with final orders of removal who lived for years or decades in the United States under orders of supervision, because Iraq would not accept their repatriation. In 2017 Iraq indicated it might change its policy; it allowed repatriation of several Iraqis with final orders. Petitioners and others similarly situated were suddenly detained and threatened with immediate removal, without the opportunity to challenge their removal in immigration court. Petitioners, who include Christians, Yezidis, Kurds, and other religious and ethnic minorities in Iraq, faced likely torture and death in Iraq. After their final orders of removal were issued, country conditions in Iraq had changed drastically, such that Petitioners had strong claims for deportation protection under, inter alia, the Convention Against Torture. In order to assert those claims, Petitioners needed to move to reopen their final orders in the appropriate immigration court. The district court found that it was impossible for them to do so, given the short time frames involved. Petitioners requested a temporary stay of removal so they could access the immigration court system. The district court granted the stay, giving Petitioners 90 days after receipt of the necessary immigration court files to file motions to reopen in immigration court. The court of appeals reversed, holding that 8 US.C. § 1252(g) divested the district court ofjurisdiction and that the elimination of jurisdiction was consistent with the Suspension Clause. The question presented is whether, as applied to Petitioners, section 1252(g) is unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause.