Whether conclusory statements of 'striking similarity' are sufficient to plead copyright infringement under the 'plausibility' standard

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Inlight of the “plausibility” standard established by this Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), where a plaintiff has not made any factual allegations regarding access, are conclusory statements that “striking similarity” exists between two works insufficient to plead a claim of copyright infringement, or do such allegations meet the pleading standard, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case? 2. Even if a pleading of striking similarity is permissible absent any pleading of access, are plaintiffs required to plead reliable evidence of copyright ownership and evidence as to what work is allegedly protected by that copyright (including official copies of the works’ copyright registrations and copies of the deposit materials submitted to the Copyright Office) in light of Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC (“Fourth Estate”), 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019), or are such materials not required to meet the pleading standard, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case? 3. Ona motion to dismiss, are a defendant’s copyrights prima facie evidence of the copyrights’ validity, the ownership of the work, and the work’s independent creation, and thus sufficient to bar a pleading of striking similarity, or is consideration of such materials inappropriate before summary judgment or trial, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case?