Neringa Venckiene v. United States
DueProcess Immigration
Whether the Seventh Circuit has correctly construed the 'political offense' exception to extradition by limiting the term only to offenses committed in the midst of war-like violent insurrections
question presented therefore asks whether the Seventh Circuit has correctly construed the “political offense” exception to extradition by limiting the term only to offenses committed in the midst of war-like violent insurrections. B. Prior Seventh Circuit precedent permitted the District Court deny an extradition request where “exceptional constitutional limitations as may exist because of particularly atrocious procedures or punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction.” See In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1487 (7th Cir. 1984). The panel in the instant case noted that Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), cast doubt “on the continuing validity or at least the scope of Burt’s constitutional and humanitarian limitations.” The panel avoided deciding the issue by assuming Burt’s continuing validity but ruling that petitioner failed to show specific atrocious procedures or punishments that would justify denying extradition anyway. The question for review asks whether Munaf v. Green overruled the il Seventh Circuit precedent and, if it did not, asks the Court to address the scope of review when the subject of an extradition request makes a claim of atrocious conditions or punishments. C. Ultimately the Secretary of State makes the final decision with respect to extradition. In the instant case petitioner received a letter from an Assistant Legal Advisor for Law Enforcement and Intelligence in the United States Department of State who stated, without elaboration, that an Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs had authorized her extradition. Two related questions are raised. First there is a jurisdictional question of whether an Under Secretary, or a Legal Advisor, had the authority to sign off on the extradition decision. If that question is answered affirmatively, the Court should grant certiorari to decide whether the Secretary of State as an entity must provide something more than a bareboned statement to satisfy its obligations when it comes to extradition.