Should this Court affirm the standard that 'claim preclusion' requires the new claim to arise from the same set of facts as a claim adjudicated on the merits in the earlier litigation?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW : 1. This case provides an issue of first impression before this Court: should this Court affirm the standard that “claim preclusion’ requires...the [new] claim arise from the same set of facts as a claim adjudicated on the merits in the earlier litigation”? U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (“EDPa.”) grant of motion to dismiss Respondents Continental Casualty Company (“Continental”) and Columbia Casualty Company (“Columbia”), affirmed by the Third Circuit (“3dCir.”), used ‘claim preclusion by arguing that plaintiff could have brought its new intentional tort claims in the previous litigation. But the previous state summary judgment dismissed on a technicality that case of legal negligent malpractice against a lawyer, not a party to this case, and therefore stated “we need not address whether issues of material fact exist concerning the individual elements of the claims.” 2. This case provides an issue of first impression before this Court: should this Court affirm precedent that finds a holding company of a wholly owned subsidiary, who controls and daily manages its holding company, liable for the conduct of its subsidiary? EDPa. grant of motion to dismiss Respondent holding company The Continental Corporation (“TCC”) regarding jurisdiction, affirmed by 3dCir., because TCC ii has no “presence or operation in Pennsylvania” conflicts with abundant precedent that there is an alter-ego relationship when one entity “controls the day-to-day operations of another” and that holding companies (TCC) of Continental are liable for Continental’s conduct in Pennsylvania. 3. Should this Court reverse EDPa. grant of motion to dismiss Respondent CNA Financial Corporation (“CNAF”) regarding jurisdiction, affirmed by 3dCir., by using “issue preclusion” when the new Complaint alleges “changes in facts essential to a judgment”? The use of “issue preclusion” in the instant case conflicts with Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 159 S.Ct. 970 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) *159: “It is, of course, true that changes in facts essential to a judgment will render collateral estopple inapplicable in a subsequent action raising the same issues. See, e.g. United States v Certain Land at Irving Place, 415 F.2d 265, 269 (CA2 1969); 1B J. Moore, Federal Practice { 0.448, pp. 4232-4233, § 0.422 [4], pp. 34123413. [add'l citations omitted].”