When a litigant presents a colorable claim of judicial-bias, does due-process entitle that litigant to an evidentiary-hearing

QUESTION PRESENTED “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.” In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 138, 136 (1955). To that end, “[rlecusal is required when, objectively speaking, the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Rippo v. Baker, 137 S. Ct. 905, 907 (2017) (per curiam) (quotation omitted). To vindicate this right, a litigant who demonstrates a genuine concern of judicial bias must have recourse to an evidentiary hearing to uncover the true facts. Indeed, “[t]his Court has long held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) (emphasis added). Neutral judges and jurors are both essential to due process, and the procedural protections should be in accord. Relevant here, Louisiana law requires the random assignment of cases and judges to appellate panels. See La. Code Civ. Proc. art. 2164.1; La. Rev. Stat. § 138:319. But, in the sprawling and politically sensitive litigation below, one Louisiana appellate judge has sat on panels handling thirty-one of fifty-two appeals and has signed sixty-six of one hundred six single-judge orders. Petitioner has presented evidence that the odds of those distributions occurring by random chance—the method of allocation mandated by state law—are infinitesimally low: 24.5 million to one and 25.7 tredecillion to one, respectively. No party has offered an innocent explanation for that facially unlawful level of participation. The question presented is: When a litigant presents a colorable claim of judicial bias, does due process entitle that litigant to an evidentiary hearing?