Keon Anthony Nixon v. United States
HabeasCorpus
Whether a defendant's 'failure to invoke the right to a speedy trial would be weighed heavily against him,' despite 'his lack of representation,' and whether denial of counsel during the period of delay results in prejudice to a defendant
QUESTION PRESENTED In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972), this Court rejected the demandwaiver doctrine in favor of a four-factor balancing test setting out the criteria by which the speedy trial right is to be judged. It identified four factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 530. The Barker Court discussed, in dicta, “a situation in which no counsel is appointed.” Id. at 529. It did not directly address this situation in the context of its balancing test. The question presented is: Whether a defendant’s “failure to invoke the right to a speedy trial would be weighed heavily against him,” despite “his lack of representation,” and whether denial of counsel during the period of delay results in prejudice to a defendant. ii